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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Richard Raymond Smith, Sr., by and through his attorney, G. 
Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & 
WRIGHT, hereby petitions the Court for rehearing, pursuant to Rule 
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH PETITIONER 
CLAIMS THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
1. There was no substantial, competent evidence to support the 
trial court's factual findings that the proceeds of the sale of Mr. 
Smith's premarital home were co-mingled and that Mr. Smith does not 
have a premarital interest in the residence at 1098 South Fir 
Street in Cedar City. The standard for review of the trial court's 
factual findings is the "clearly erroneous" standard. Hagan v. 
Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Mrs. Smith's child support receivable accrued during the 
parties' marriage is a marital asset that should have been 
considered in the division of marital property. The standard for 
appellate review of this aspect of the case is a "correction of 
error" standard, giving no deference to the trial court. Maxwell 
v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Mr. Smith's 401K salaried savings plan should have been 
valued as of the date of the parties' separation, prior to his 
contribution of post-separation earnings to increase the value of 
the account. The standard for appellate review of this aspect of 
the case is a "correction of error" standard, giving no deference 
to the trial court. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
To the extent it is necessary to include a Statement of the 
Case in a Petition for Rehearing, Petitioner incorporates by 
reference herein the Statement of the Case as set forth in the 
Brief of Appellant in this matter. 
On October 21, 1994, a Memorandum Decision was filed in this 
matter, affirming the trial court's decision on all issues. Only 
the claims relating to the home in Cedar City were addressed in the 
written opinion. All other issues were considered without merit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In light of the length of the argument presented herein, no 
summary of the argument is presented. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
TO THE EXTENT THE COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CEDAR CITY 
HOME AS A MARITAL ASSET WAS BASED ON A FACTUAL FINDING THAT MARITAL 
FUNDS WERE USED TO PURCHASE THE HOME, THAT CONCLUSION SHOULD BE SET 
2 
ASIDE SINCE THE FINDING THAT MARITAL FUNDS WERE USED TO PURCHASE 
THE HOME WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court has broad discretion to fashion an equitable 
distribution of property between the parties. However, in 
fashioning that equitable distribution, the trial court must first 
determine whether property is marital or separate (Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166 at 1172 (Utah App. 1990). 
If the trial court's responsibility to distinguish between 
separate and marital property is to be meaningful at all, the trial 
court's classification of property as separate or marital must be 
supported by substantial credible evidence. As pointed out in 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "A finding not supported 
by substantial competent evidence is clearly erroneous." Jd. at 
687. In 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole 
cloth; substantial, competent evidence must exist that 
supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not 
so supported, it must be rejected. Jd. at 1171 
In this case there was no evidence to support a factual 
finding that proceeds from the sale of the Mr. Smith's premarital 
home were commingled with the marital estate. Mrs. Smith's 
testimony that she "believed" the money for the down payment for 
purchase of the home came from the parties' joint account (T1 at 
71) can hardly rise to the level of substantial, competent evidence 
when she admitted that she did not know where the funds came from 
References to the transcript of trial shall be designated by 
the letter "T" followed by the page of the trial transcript. 
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to buy the home (T at 52). Mr. Smith then testified that he did 
know where the funds came from to buy the home and that the funds 
came from the proceeds of the sale of his premarital home in 
Mission Hills, California (T at 518-519). Mrs. Smith admitted the 
proceeds of the sale of his premarital home were Mr. Smith's 
premarital funds (T at 431), in which she did not claim any 
interest (T at 399) because the Mission Hills home was Mr. Smith's 
premarital asset (T at 490). Mr. Smith also testified that the 
monthly mortgage payments made to purchase the home came from his 
Langley Credit Union checking account (T at 601-602) into which his 
premarital and separate Air Force retirement had been deposited and 
into which no other funds were deposited during the marriage (T at 
499). The evidence at trial supported only one conclusion, that 
the funds used to purchase the Cedar City home were Mr. Smith's 
separate property. 
This Court's written opinion seems to suggest that, despite 
Mrs. Smith's lack of knowledge and Mr. Smith's specific testimony, 
Mr. Smith was still under an obligation to present documentary 
evidence at trial to support his uncontradicted testimony. To the 
extent that the Court of Appeals' decision is based on Mr. Smith's 
failure to produce additional documentary exhibits at trial on 
issues for which there was no real conflict in the evidence, 
Petitioner requests that the Court of Appeals remand the case to 
the trial court for the presentation of such additional documentary 
evidence. 
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In this case the trial court erred when it concluded that Mr, 
Smith did not have a separate property interest in the residence at 
1098 South Fir Street (Record at 369). Since the trial court's 
decision to treat that property as marital property, in which each 
party had an equal interest, was apparently based on its finding 
that Mr, Smith had no separate property interest in the home, that 
finding should be set aside and, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances which would justify including that separate asset in 
the marital estate, the home should be awarded to Mr. Smith as his 
sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Mrs. 
Smith to the same. 
II. 
MR. SMITH'S CLAIMS THAT MRS. SMITH'S CHILD SUPPORT RECEIVABLE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED AS A MARITAL ASSET AND THAT THE VALUE OF 
HIS 401K SALARIED SAVINGS PLAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN VALUED AS OF THE 
DATE THE PARTIES SEPARATED HAVE MERIT AND THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED. 
The Court of Appeals is not obligated to address in its 
opinion each issue presented on appeal. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886 at 888 (Utah 1989). However, the Petitioner respectfully 
requests that the Court reconsider at least two of the issues 
presented by this appeal. Those issues involve: 1) treatment of 
Mrs. Smith's child support receivable accrued during the marriage, 
and 2) the valuation date for the Mr. Smith's 401K salaried savings 
plan. 
A. The Child Support Receivable Accrued During the 
Marriage Is An Asset Of The Marital Estate. 
With regard to Mr. Smith's claim that the child support 
5 
receivable accumulated in Mrs. Smith's favor during the parties' 
marriage is a marital asset, the trial court found simply that: 
Plaintiff's accounts receivable for child support from a 
prior marriage are not an asset of the marriage and not 
something the court should distribute as part of this 
action. The court finds those to be a premarital 
obligation of a prior husband and, as such, are not 
appropriate for the court to distribute as an asset of 
the marriage in this case. (Record at 363). 
That finding is clearly in error. Child support is not a lump 
sum debt on the date the support is ordered, payable in monthly 
installments, as suggested by the trial court's characterization of 
the receivable as a premarital obligation. Each installment of 
child support in this state is considered separately and becomes a 
judgment, entitled to full faith and credit "on and after the date 
it is due..." UCA §30-3-10.6(1). Where a stepparent, whether on 
his own behalf or on behalf of the marital partnership, has 
supported the child during the marriage and at the time each 
"judgment" arose, the trial court should at least consider those 
"judgments" in dividing the marital estate, subject to valuation 
and equitable allocation. Had the court ordered support been paid 
and used to help support the child, thereby making available more 
disposable income for the parties, any property purchased with the 
additional disposable income would be clearly subject to award by 
the Court. The support receivable that has accrued should be 
treated the same. Petitioner has no objection to Mrs. Smith 
receiving the asset. However, there should be a proper accounting 
of the same as it relates to disposition of the entire marital 
estate. 
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B. The 401K Salaried Savings Plan Should Have Been 
Valued As Of The Date The Parties Separated, 
^The choice of laws issue presented in this case, relating to 
treatment of retirement funds purchased with post-separation 
earnings, should be resolved in favor of the law of the state where 
the money was earned. 
In California, post-separation earnings are separate property. 
In Utah, property is generally valued as of the date of divorce. 
If one spouse resides full time in one state and the other spouse, 
while maintaining the common residence in that state, works and 
maintains a second residence in a foreign state, a conflict between 
the law of the two states as it relates to treatment of marital 
assets should be resolved in favor of the state having the closest 
contact with the asset. In this instance, involving a 401K 
salaried savings plan acquired with earnings from Mr. Smith's 
California employer and maintained in that state, the law of the 
state of California should govern. Petitioner therefore 
respectfully requests that this Court rule that California law 
should govern classification of post-separation contributions to 
the 401k salaried savings plan as separate property. 
In the event this Court were to determine that California law 
were not applicable to post-separation contributions to the 401K 
salaried savings plan, the asset should still be valued as of the 
date of separation to the extent that any increase in the value of 
the savings plan resulted from the exclusive efforts of one party. 
This Court has held that if one party has dissipated an asset then 
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the trial court may value the property at an earlier date, i.e., 
the date of separation. Peck v. Peck/ 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 
1987). It stands to reason that, if one party, through his or her 
independent efforts has enhanced an asset, an alternate valuation 
date may also be, and in this instance is, appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully submits that the evidence does not 
support the trial court•s finding that the proceeds of the sale of 
Mr. Smith's premarital home were co-mingled and that he did not 
have a premarital interest in the home in Cedar City. In 
addition, two issues considered by this Court to be without merit, 
i.e., consideration of the accumulated child support as a 
receivable of the marriage and establishing the valuation date for 
the 401K salaried savings plan as the date of separation, should be 
resolved in favor of Petitioner. The trial court's findings and 
order on each issue should be reversed. 
Counsel for Petitioner respectfully certifies that this 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this , *K7_ day of November, 1994. 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
w~ 
/Q'. Mi^£el/#eTstMll 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
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